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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
No. 14732 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
RAY KITCHEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Ray Kitchen, appeals from the finding of 
guilty to the charge of aiding and abetting Lynn Christiansen 
to present or cause to be presented proof in support of a 
false or fraudulent claim upon a contract of insurance for 
the payment of a loss, a felony of the second degree and 
the sentence imposed thereon in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, Provo, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On the 30th day of July, 1976, the appellant, Ray 
Kitchen, having been convicted by a jury of aiding and 
abetting Lynn Christiansen in filing a false insurance claim, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was sentenced to the Utah State Prison and fined $500.00. 
Execution of the prison term was suspended and the defendant 
was placed on two years probation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks this Court to remand the case for 
retrial or to reverse the conviction for aiding and abetting 
Lynn Christiansen in filing a false insurance claim. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Lynn Christiansen was the principal in the criminal 
episode. He was given immunity from prosecution on the 
charge of filing a false insurance claim as well as on a 
separate forgery charge, in exchange for his testimony 
against the defendant. The defendant was convicted of 
aiding and abetting Lynn Christiansen in the filing of his 
false insurance claim. 
Without question Christiansen's home was burglarized 
on or about June 14, 1975, thereafter he filed an insurance 
claim with National American Insurance Company. It is 
further uncontroverted that $140.00 in cash, a Sony cassette 
stereo, a silver jewelery case and a Sony clock-radio were 
taken, although there was testimony at the trial that Mr. 
Christiansen's ex-wife had taken the Sony clock-radio without 
his knowledge. Those four items above were included on 
the insurance claim together with two diamond rings, which 
were purportedly not taken. 
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When the adjuster received the claim he required 
proof of ownership. Lynn Christiansen had been a regular 
customer of the defendant and had made numerous purchases 
from him, including rings, watches, a Sony T.V. set, a 
stereo, speakers and radio etc. Christiansen requested 
receipts from defendant and defendant supplied the 
receipts in Exhibits 4 and 5. Christiansen then submitted 
the claim form and receipts, receiving a draft for $1,130.75 
from National American Insurance Company, payable to Lynn 
and Connie Christiansen. He forged his wife's endorsement 
and deposited the draft in his account using the proceeds 
exclusively for his own benefit. 
Apparently, at the request of Christiansen's ex-wife, 
an investigation was initiated by the Utah County Attorneyfs 
Office in February of 1975. The investigators, from the 
outset, seemed more concerned with prosecuting the defendant 
than Mr. Christiansen. Mr. Christiansen testified that 
"It was either mine or his skin. It looked like he was a 
bigger pigeon.11 (R. 199) 
On July 18, 1975, investigators from the Utah County 
Attorney's Office went to the defendant's place of business 
and asked him if he had made out the receipts which had 
been used to substantiate Christiansen's claim. Defendant 
replied that he had done so. The investigators then asked for 
defendant's records and defendant replied that they were 
over one year old and no longer were in his possession but he Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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would attempt to obtain them. When the investigators returned 
the invoices had not been found and a rather heated exchange 
took place; they left without the requested information. 
Shortly thereafter charges were filed and at trial, a 
verdict of guilty was returned. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NO CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE OF THE ACCOMPLICE'S TESTIMONY WAS 
GIVEN AT TRIAL AND THE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT BE SUSTAINED. 
"77-31-18 Conviction on testimony of accomplice." 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
"A conviction shall not be had on the 
testimony of an accomplice, unless he 
is corroborated by other evidence, 
which in itself and without the aid 
of the testimony of the accomplice 
tends to connect the defendant with 
the commission of the offense; and 
the corroboration shall not be suf-
ficient, if it merely shows the commis-
sion of the offense or the circumstances 
thereof.11 
It is established beyond question that an accomplice's 
testimony need not be corroborated with respect to every 
material fact, but only in respect to such material facts 
as constitute necessary elements of the crime. State v. 
Collett, 20 U. 290, 58 P. 684; State v. Spencer, 15 U. 149, 
49 P. 302; State v. Somers, 97 U. 132, 90 P.2d 273 (1939); 
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State v. Erwin, 101 U. 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941); State v. 
Simpson, 120 U. 596, 236 P.2d 1077 (1951). 
The trial court ruled that Lynn Christiansen was 
an accomplice and instructed the jury that in order to 
convict the defendant, Christiansen's testimony must be 
corroborated (R. 36). The prosecutor urged the jury and 
the court that the admitted fact that the defendant pre-
pared the receipts in the instant case and the fact that 
Christiansen's former wife testified that she was not aware 
of Christiansen's ownership of any of the items listed on 
the claim, except the Sony clock-radio, at the time of the 
burglary in June of 1974, was sufficient corroboration 
(R. 6). 
To determine if corroboration is sufficient this 
court has stated that the evidence must be reviewed dis-
regarding the testimony of the accomplice. State v. 
Simpson, supra; State v. Vigil, 123 U. 495, 260 P.2d 539 
(1953); State v. Clark, 3 U.2d 382, 284 P.2d 700 (1955). 
!fthe corroborating evidence must 
connect the defendant with the com-
mission of the offense State v. Lay, 
38 Utah 143, 110 P. 986 (1910); and 
be consistent with his guilt and 
inconsistent with his innocence, 
State v. Butterfield 70 Utah 529, 
261 P. 804. The corroborating 
evidence must do more than cast a 
grave suspicion on the defendant and 
it must do all of these things with-
out the aid of the testimony of the 
accomplice.f! State v. Vigil, supra 
at 123 U. 497, 260 P.2d 541. 
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Without the testimony of Lynn Christiansen there is no evidence 
that any crime was ever committed. 
"[19] In order to sustain a conviction, 
the evidence must not only show the corpus 
delicti independent of the admissions and 
connect each defendant convicted with the 
offense charged, without the aid of the 
testimony of an accomplice, but also must 
be of such persuasive force that the mind 
might be reasonably satisfied of all the 
necessary facts constituting the defend-
ant's guilt beyond any reasonable doubt; 
and where the proof of a necessary fact 
is dependent solely upon circumstantial 
evidence, such circumstances must be such 
as to reasonably exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis other than the existence of such 
fact and be consistent with its existence 
and inconsistent with its non-existence. It 
is not necessary that each circumstance in 
itself establish the guilt of the defendant, 
but the whole chain of circumstances, tak-
en together, must produce the required 
proof. State v. Crawford, 59 Utah 39, 201 
P. 1030; State v. Marasco, 81 Utah 325, 17 
P.2d 919; Terry v. United States, 9 Cir., 
7 F.2d 28; State v. Burch, Utah, 115 P.2d 
911," State v. Erwin, supra. 
Aside from Christiansen's testimony, what evicence con-
sistent with the guilt of the defendant and inconsistent with 
his innocence is there? The testimony of the insurance 
adjuster, the two investigators for the Utah County Attorney's 
Office, the defendant and his employee merely establish that the 
defendant authored two receipts which were used to prove 
ownership of the items claimed. Nothing in their testimony 
would corroborate Christiansen's testimony under the rules 
stated by this Court. 
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The only other witness for the State in corroboration 
was Christiansen's ex-wife. She testified that at the time 
of the burglary she and Mr. Christiansen were legally sep-
arated and not living together (R. 154). She stated that 
she was unaware of the burglary or of the existence of the 
items listed on the claim with two exceptions. She stated 
that an antique jewelery box was in fact owned by them and 
in fact was missing (R. 158) and further that Christiansen 
did in fact oxm. a Sony clock-radio, the place of purchase 
was unknown to her (R. 156). No other evidence in cor-
roboration was presented. Nor is there proof of the corpus 
delecti absent the testimony of the accomplice, as required 
by State v. Erwin, supra, et al. 
"It is well established that a defendant may not be 
convicted by a jury upon uncorroborated testimony of an 
accomplice, even though they believe his testimony as to 
every material fact and are convinced of the guilt of the 
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Lay, supra. 
In the instant case the jury did so and their verdict 
should be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL DOES NOT SUPPORT A CONVICTION 
IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS: 
(A) The claim filed was not a "false or fraudulent 
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claim1' as defined by this court in Burke v. Knox, 
59 U. 596, 206 P. 711 (1922) but rather an nexcessive 
claimM. 
(B) If the claim was false or fraudulent, the false 
or fraudulent portion did not exceed $1,000.00. 
(A) This court has drawn a distinction between "false or 
fraudulent claimsn and "excessive claims" in Burke v. Knox, 
supra. In that case a county commissioner was charged with 
having made a "false or fraudulent claim" upon a claim for 
travel reimbursement and this court held, 
"If the Plaintiff presented merely an 
excessive claim for expenses incurred in 
traveling, that is one thing. If he 
presented a claim or charge for a trip 
that he did not make at all, that is 
quite a different matter. Presenting 
a merely excessive claim without intent 
to defraud would not constitute a felony. . ." 
Burke v. Knox id at 206 P. 714. 
Since the evidence adduced by the State, taken in its 
most favorable light, indicates that at the time Christiansen 
filed his claim he believed all items, except two, had been 
taken. Therefore, his claim was excessive, but not false and 
fraudulent. (See also, People v. Nichols, 125 P.2d 513 
(Cal 1942); Nemecek v. State, 114 P.2d 492 (Okla 1941). 
(B) The record indicates (R. 89) that the claim filed by 
Christiansen was in part true and in part false. The only 
items on the claim which in fact were not thought to have been 
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taken in the burglary were the two diamond rings (R. 195) 
and the stereo speakers which Christiansen had in fact 
purchased from defendant (R. 185). The value placed on 
the rings was $675.00. 
Taken another way, the information alleged that 
defendant aided and abetted Lynn Christiansen to file a 
false insurance claim in the amount of $1,130.75. The 
evidence proves that $140.00 in cash, a Sony clock-radio, 
a silver jewelery case, the amplifier and recording 
head portion of a Sony cassette tape deck and $45.50 
worth of tapes were missing and thought to have been 
stolen at the time the claim was filed by Lynn Christiansen. 
The jury did not believe the defendant nor Sheryl 
Mecham, defendants employee, when they testified that 
defendant had sold all of the items listed on the receipts 
to Christiansen. The jury could not have believed Christian-
sen when he testified that he had purchased the stereo 
speakers from defendant and that $140.00 in cash had been 
taken with the stereo, jewelery case, tapes and cassettes. 
However, simple mathematics now leaves the State without 
an iota of evidence supporting conviction of the defendant 
of the crime set forth in the information. 
"76-6-521 False or fraudulent insurance claim -
Punishment as for theft.11 provides in pertinent part as 
follows : 
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"Every person . . . who prepares . . . 
any . . . writing . . . with intent to . . . 
allow it to be presented or used, in sup-
port of any such claim [a false or fraud-
ulent claim upon a contract of insurance 
for the payment of loss] is punishable 
as in the manner prescribed for theft 
of property of like value.!f 
"76-6-412 Theft - Classification of Offenses . . ." 
reads in pertinent part as follows: 
"(1) Theft of property and services as provided in 
this chapter shall be punishable as follows: 
(a) As a felony of the second degree if: 
(i) The value of the property 
or services exceeds $1,000.00; . . . 
(b) As a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) The value of the property or 
services is more than $250.00, 
but not more than $1,000.00; . . ." 
It is well established that a claim which is false or 
fraudulent only in part, may be prosecuted if at all only to 
the extent to which it is excessive Burke v. Knox, supra; 
People v. Dally, 24 N.Y.S-.2d 692 at 695. 
It would appear that Lynn Christiansen did not file 
a false or fraudulent claim in excess of $1,000.00 therefore, 
defendant could not lawfully have been convicted of a 
second degree felony of aiding and abetting the filing of 
such a claim. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the conviction of 
the defendant was contrary to law, in that there was no 
• 
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corroboration of the accomplice's testimony nor indepen-
dant proof of the corpus delecti and that the proof of 
the false claim was deficient, and should be reversed and 
remanded for dismissal or retrial. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of December, 1976, 
/ —:H ^ ft I 
A-^i^-fji:^ JAMES A. McINTYRE 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
2525 South Main Street #2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
I hereby certify that I caused three copies of the 
foregoing to be delivered, this 29th day of December, 1976, 
to Vernon B. Romney, Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, 
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84104. 
/U^£..-:•<;/. 
JAMES A. McINTYRE 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
